Noetiku].
11 Patočka's 1933 encounter with Husserl was also an encounter with Klein and Fink, both encouraging him to attend Heidegger's seminars. These intellectual contacts took place after writing his CE. Hence, revisiting his PhD dissertation may provide us with a different perspective from which to assess Patočka's thinking prior to his conversations with Husserl, Fink and his encounter with Heidegger. Given, that for Patočka, the history of thinking is conditio sine qua non of thinking per se, I suggest that Patočka's attention to this historical perspective might be one of the ways to assess his early writing.
My aim in this paper, then, is to highlight certain themes that are present in Patočka's PhD
Dissertation from 1931. I will not claim that this is the only way to interpret Patočka's dissertation, and I will not present a sustained interpretation of its content. However, I will argue that certain concerns that are present there never leave Patočka's thinking. Moreover, there is a tension between his overall epistemological focus based on cognition only and his concern with beings, which exceeds his purported concern with evidence and knowing.
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In CE, Patočka offers an historical account of the concept of evidence by considering the methodology of modern science based on modern epistemology as inaugurated by René
Descartes. His concern is how we can navigate between the Scylla of empirical evidence, 13 which is by definition changing, and the Charybdis of immutable a priori ideas of the rationalists that are supposedly innate. 14 To offer a different approach to the concept of evidence, Patočka examines rationalist and empiricist systems. He points out that rationalists dispense with the idea of the external world and construct it through "method", 15 while empiricists -dispensing with the external world as well -place it in the human mind on the model of spatium, where ideas are almost literally taken as 'pictures' of external things in the mind. Following from this unexamined assumption, we supposedly compose complex ideas from simple ideas. 16 Who or what 'performs' this composition was already questioned by Leibniz. 17 The historical account that Patočka presents points to the importance of the concept of evidence that is equally pertinent to both positions and highlights the problem at the heart of modern epistemology.
Rationalism and empiricism are the outcome of Descartes' search for the certainty of knowledge and the self-sustained absolute evidence that does not need any other thing for its existence 11 From now on referred to as CE. 12 James Mensch points the similar tension in Husserl's Logical Investigations. See Mensch, 1981. 13 See Part II on empirical genesis (Patočka, [1931 , 87-100). 14 See Part II on the genesis of rationalism (Ibid, (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) . 15 Ibid, 86 16 Ibid, 88; cf. Locke, esp. Locke, 1976 [1690 , Book II, Chapter XXV, 1, 2, . 17 Leibniz, 1934 Leibniz, [1765 ["nulla re indigeat ad existendum"]. 18 In Descartes, of course, only God fulfils this condition, because God creates everything, hence he does not need anything else for his being. However, per analogiam, Descartes uses the being of God to argue that, since res cogitans and res extensa need nothing except God to exist, in this derivative sense, these two substances into which he splits the world are not only self-sufficient, but also self-subsistent.
19
Rationalism takes over the notion of 'absolute evidence,' while, by contrast, empiricists question the rationalist idea of absolute evidence, arguing instead that evidence must come from
experience. Yet, since empiricists accept the Cartesian split between the world and thinking, there remains the problem of accounting for experience. In what way do we experience things in the world, if the world is independent from our thinking? Given the history of modern epistemology, Patočka asks how can we account for human knowledge, how can we jump over the crevasse between the world and thinking created by the tradition? To reconsider modern epistemology, Patočka starts with cognition. How can we know that our thinking is about the world, how can we know the meaningful whole and the truth that is its correlate? How can we think about the evidence that we need in order to justify the meaning constitution of a triangle, for example? He suggests that this "thought-whole" of a triangle is "the object of cognition", therefore it cannot be "independent from me; it is not inaccessible to me". 20 However, is knowing a triangle enough to account for the being of a triangle? How do we know that the triangle about which we think is in reality? Is it possible to infer from knowing the triangle that triangles exist? Patočka does not ask these questions but he asks, instead, how we can address Patočka, [1931 , 76. In ed. note: "co žádnou věc nepotřebuje ke své existenci". (editor's note in Patočka, [1931 , note 108, 76). In Descartes' English translation: "By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence" (Descartes, 1985, I, 51, 24 [210] , italics in original). 19 Descartes, 1985 , I, 52, 25 20 Patočka, 2008 [1931 26 We know that when we throw a rock against the window, it is very likely that the window will break. In this sense, we experience a connection between our action and the broken window, we see the regularity of our acting; we also see the regularity of certain events we encounter in the world. We know, in the terms of common sense, that the sun will come up every morning and set in the evening, leaves will fall and birds will fly up north in the autumn. This regularity (or typicality, as Husserl calls it) is a part of our living. However, this typical acceptance of cause and effect that we experience is not the causality that science must presuppose for its own investigations of nature. We should not conflate the regularity we experience in our everyday living with the idea of perfect causality in the domain of science. Those are different ideas.
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23 Patočka, [1931 The problem of the connection between the world and our thinking is not endemic to empiricism only. As already noted, it starts with Descartes and his search for certainty of knowledge, which he supposedly achieves by splitting the world into res cogitans and res extensa. Evidence becomes the measure of truth based on cogito sum, 31 thereby instituting the separation of a being that is in the world from the knowing subject. The connection between knowing and being becomes the "riddle of transcendence" 32 or "the enigma of all enigmas", as Husserl expresses it. 33 Since the connection between things in the world and the mind is explained through causality, truth is explained as "adequatio intellectus et rei", which, according to Patočka, is pure myth. There is no possibility to explain knowledge on this model. Patočka points out that we have no access to "absolute being" that we can use as a reason for evidence. We can only use "a being that reveals itself", thereby letting us "know it". 34 One may note here that the question of being and knowing are interrelated in this instance. If something reveals itself to me, then that something must have an independent being from me. Yet, it seems that for Patočka this revealing is a revealing in immanence, in other words, in our thinking. It is this revealing of a being that Patočka refers to as evidence. Patočka explains that "a being for me" is limited by "how and as long as it reveals itself". Therefore, "an outside being becomes an 'inside' being; the meaning of the existence of a being coincides with a being for me". 35 It follows then, that truth is not a correspondence of a being in the world and intellect, but it is the idea of a thought-whole constituted through knowing because the "truth of the subjectified being is necessarily the idea only, "Descartes built a new metaphysical system". Here Patočka reflects on the change of our thinking again by noting that the Cartesian transformation of thinking is hard to gauge these days, because the "revolution, launched by Descartes, was successful in some respects all too perfectly". 47 The Cartesian conception of the world led to the rupture in our understanding of the world: between the world of our living and its scientific construct. Now, Patočka thinks this split differently. It is no longer only the abyss between our thinking and the world. He extends it in a form he is to elaborate in more detail in his habilitation The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem (Přirozený Svět Jako Filosofický Problém). 48 In the "Afterword," Patočka points out that "on the one side, we are spiritual beings, primarily closed within ourselves, on the other side, the world of objects is understood purely rationally and geometrically, without qualities, without inner forces". 49 This fractured world is the problem of present-day science and philosophy.
50
In CE, this fracture is not yet addressed. However, in his "Sketch of the evident structures of our world", 51 Patočka notes that "a correlation of the subject and object and the form of time is the most universal basis of concrete experience". 52 The flow of experience is temporal.
"Consciousness becomes dynamic" with its own time experience, where "past awaits each Patočka, 1992 Patočka, [1933 , 65 48 Patočka, 2008 48 Patočka, [1936 49 Patočka, 1992 Patočka, [1933 Patočka follows his discussion of our understanding of ideas and their different role in the mathematical and natural sciences. He points out that this is a domain of natural laws only.
Except in formal domains, there cannot be ideal laws. Nature changes through time. Things influence each other constantly. Yet these changes are not arbitrary. The "conditio sine qua non of natural being" is time, which means that "everything that is has the reason for its being in the past". 58 Reason for change is in the past that influences the future. From this observation comes the idea of scientific causality leading to the lawfulness of nature. However, this lawfulness is predicated on the neutralisation of time to a homogeneous medium that is free of contingency. In other words, although, "the idea of scientific causality leads naturally to the idea of natural lawfulness," natural science cannot reduce this lawfulness to its logical moment. To reduce nature to its scientific model would mean that the world of our living will become "only the The principle of constancy gives certainty to the natural scientist in researching the 'facts of nature' relative to the current state of knowledge. For the "Ancient Ionian physicists, the fact was that the Earth is flat", while for us this is simply a "prejudice". 62 There is a relation between the state of scientific knowledge and the form of evidence employed because scientific cognition and the evidence needed for its support are mutable. Each new aspect of knowledge requires new evidence. The science of Ancient Ionians is incompatible with science today. Present natural science constitutes the world based on spatial and causal relationships. 63 This is important to remember: with new inventions and the shattering of old models, what counts as evidence for knowing undergoes modification. However, there is a constant that demarcates the modern sciences. Each science is based on the foundation and a set of basic principles in each regional domain that are established deductively. From these fundamental principles, scientific nature is built or shattered whenever those principles become challenged and new foundation need to be laid for new knowledge claims. In this sense, the scientifically constructed world is "independent of the subject, it does not belong to him"; scientific nature is built from the ideas of homogeneous space, time and causality, from which the subject is excluded.
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In contrast, we live in the world that we understand practically through our acting there. This is the "subjective world" which includes the experience of all subjects. Here we speak of "intentional acts", such as "perceiving, remembering, judging, valuing. The subject has oneself in his own acts and through the acts, he has all other objects." 65 The question is how we can know other subjects. What kind of evidence is needed for recognition of the other? We have to be careful not to "hypostatise the other subject as well as ourselves on the model of a substance, which persists, even if nobody is aware of it." 66 Here evidence is not the same as in natural science. Our awareness of doing, acting and the responsible realisation of our aims is "evidence where our life takes place, especially our cultural life". The "principle of this evidence is the conceptual correlation of ends and means". Patočka concludes his consideration of the structures of our world by noting that we have two flows of life that constitute the world in two different ways: one is the objective world of science, the other is the subjective world of various regions of values. 68 The question is how the concept of evidence applies to these different regions. As he notes, the study of evidence is to make clear how reasons lead to the constitution of the meaningful whole. According to Patočka, it would also mean to sort out a perennial problem of philosophy, the question of being [otázku jsoucna], or at least to look for its solution. The concept of evidence, then, requires that in order "to write the history of modern philosophy" we need to "examine different approaches that offered a solution to this problem". 69 It is said that modern philosophy is the search for the correct sense of evidence. Thus, the essence of philosophy should be to unify life that is spread between different regions of being; to return to life the awareness of its unity, to provide the "balance sheet of spirit with itself".
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Questions
Patočka's starting point is the history of thinking, with the particular focus on the idea of evidence. He sketches the historical unfolding of this concept. His aim is to show that only through a historical untangling of the problem of evidence, can we make sense of our current notion of evidence and its scientific character as it developed throughout history. Thus, only by understanding the history of ideas, can we understand the present crisis of philosophy and science.
At the heart of Patočka's dissertation is the history of scientific reasoning, especially as it is ineluctably tied with mathematics and mathematical logic. cannot be knowing; hence it might be taken as a predecessor to his late meditations on asubjective phenomenology. There are other aspects in CE that could support this reading, as for example, when Patočka discusses "the correlation of subject-object", he notes that a flow of consciousness is tied to one subject only, constituting the unity of experience. This primordial fact of conscious experience does not require diversity on the side of the object. As he elaborates, for the unity of experience of a thing it is not necessary to have the multiplicity inherent in the thing; yet the object has this multiplicity. 75 Patočka also reflects on the idea of the subject and asks who is this 'I' that knows, "why am I We need to clear our seeing from the encrustations inherited from the tradition. Phenomenology must concentrate on the appearing as such. As Patočka claims, Husserl and Heidegger lost this appearing as such by stepping over to what already appears.
In conclusion, I will allude to Patočka's CE once more. Citing Maine de Biran and Jacobi, 83 Patočka explains how the wonder experienced in childhood in the face of the mystery of existence and the wonder about the intuition of eternity, respectively, marked the two philosophers' path of thinking. The same might be said of Patočka himself. Throughout his life, Patočka's philosophical interests seem to circle around the questions concerning meaning constitution, truth and responsibility. From the beginning to the end, Patočka circumnavigates the same problems looking at language, the world, the body, and human existence from different perspectives. His approach to considering the same things under many 'shades of light' is in itself a profoundly phenomenological practice. 80 Rezek, 2010, 13 81 Patočka, 1993, 72 . "Při každém zjevování musíme nutně předpokládat, že to, co se nám zjevuje, jest, že je to skutečné bytí, že to není pouhý fenomén, kus našeho prožívání, že to není něco jakkoli privátního, že to jest v silném smyslu slova. Co toto 'jest' znamená? Jsoucna se nám odkrývají v tom, že jsou a jaká jsou." 82 Ibid, 73-74 83 Patočka, [1931 , 19
